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O

ver 100 years ago, the philosopher-strategist Carl von Clausewitz
wrote that a trinity of passion, chance, and political purpose
drives the vicissitudes of war. In Carnage & Connectivity, David
Betz supports this view. He offers a concise, witty, insightful argument
for the proposition “war itself has not changed,” though changes in technology have complicated its dynamics. He states his case up front and
through his review of literature and evolving military doctrines marshals
compelling evidence to support his proposition.
As Betz sees it, “quixotically, the major military powers in the West
have serially tried and failed to use technology to disconnect from
war’s enduring nature.” They chase solutions using high-tech weaponry that increase the speed at which combat is conducted, but do not
affect the forces in Clausewitz’s trinity that continue to govern warfare.
The consequences can prove costly. They espouse a form of war that
largely replaces forces on the ground with force delivered by long-range
weapons. “Each time,” he observes, “all they have managed to grasp is
a slow, bitter, indecisive war.”
One cannot achieve victory, Betz argues, by replacing chance in
war with information systems, including weaponized malware (cyber
weapons), and passion with long-range weapons and spin and compensating for failures of policy and strategic vision with tactics that avoid
contact with the enemy—and, one might add, casualties. Indeed a criticism skeptics level against current US policy is it too often seeks to wage
a “bloodless” war through the use of drone and air strikes, rather than
with boots on the ground. How bloodless such a war may be depends
greatly on whether you sit on the sending or receiving end.
Betz skillfully examines how emerging new technologies and a globally connected world have altered warfare. He recognizes the benefits of
empowering individuals, but cautions about the darker side. Connectivity
provides revolutionary new tools for persuasion. These tools can help
articulate a strategic narrative that shapes perceptions, beliefs, and ideals
of target audiences, changes behavior, and effects a desired end-state.
New technology has altered the capacity of parties to forge and execute
strategies, operations, and tactics. What it does not do is change the
core truths Clausewitz’s trinity embodies. The West may have bigger,
more high-tech weapons, but as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have
demonstrated, Betz says, these cannot compensate for the “deficit of
passion” that motivates enemies comprised of moderately organized and
loosely affiliated non-state groups. For them, while chance may always
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play a role, intensely motivated, purposeful
enemies using low-tech methods can still
defeat high-tech opponents.
Betz cites several examples to show
how new technology in prior eras misled
commanders into believing the nature
of war had changed. Cyber tactics can
employ social engineering or “phishing” to
mislead enemies. The technology is new;
the concept is old. During the American
Civil War, Confederate cavalry seized Union
telegraph communications—then new technology—to send false orders and reshape
the information environment. During the
Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, clever
David Betz, Carnage & Connectivity:
Germans trained falcons, turning them into
Landmarks in the Decline of Conventional
weaponized predators to intercept French
Military Power (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2015), 261 pages, $45.00 carrier pigeons delivering messages. In
World War II, radar helped destroy German
U-boats. None of these examples altered the importance of passion,
chance, and purpose in war, although new technology broadened the
capacity and ability of actors to wage war.
Connectivity has increased the number and types of actors who
can influence outcomes, empowering non-state as well as state actors.
It has enabled violent movements to operate in networked, distributive
forms that counter conventional military tactics. It increases the capacity
for intellignece, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)—but also makes
operations more transparent, complicating efforts to execute tactics
through stealth. For liberal democracies, articulating coherent, credible
narratives that support military operations is more challenging. Indeed,
Betz points out, connectivity renders disrupters more flexible, adaptable,
and dangerous. In a prior era, logistics presented problems more easily
avoided today. Disrupters can now focus on ideas and move them in
digital form rather than allow for logistics.
Technology has rendered modern armies more lethal. Yet that can
produce illusionary victories. Betz cites the 1991 and 2003 Iraq Wars as
examples. Our technology and the remarkable skill of our forces were
so exceptional they overwhelmed enemies who were never really in the
fight. Here, Betz returns to Clausewitz for a pivotal insight. Clausewitz
observed war consists of “acts of force to compel our enemy to do our
will.” Defeating the enemy kinetically in a battlespace does not necessarily equal winning. Winning requires the enemy to recognize it has been
defeated and to subject itself to the victor’s will. Saddam’s resurgence
after Desert Storm and the long war waged by al-Qaeda and other insurgents after the fall of Baghdad in 2003 attest to the pitfalls that occur
when an enemy denies it is defeated.
Betz challenges the view that the Revolution in Military Affairs
(RMA) has altered the character and conduct of conflict. RMA advocates
believe advanced technology and the developing “system of systems”
give commanders a clearer, more-rapid grasp of complex situations.
This technological edge enables forces to operate within an opponent’s
decision and action cycles, make the right decisions, and outthink and
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outmaneuver an opponent. Betz believes
RMA symbolizes a “blind faith in technology” that could prove self-defeating in
fighting today’s less-encumbered opponents.
As Betz sees it, today’s conflicts demonstrate
“the near impossibility of operating within
the decision-cycle of any opponents without
a high degree of political clarity about the
purpose [and] the issue of force in the first
place,” something he argues is increasingly
difficult to identify. Betz offers a compelling
case for his key point, that evolving technology does not replace the Clausewitz trinity
in understanding the dynamics determining
outcomes in war.
De Graaf, George Dimitriu,
Betz’s points invite competing views. Beatrice
and Jens Ringsmose, Editors, Strategic
Public Opinion, and War:
He agrees with C. E. Callwell who argued Narratives,
Winning Domestic Support for the Afghan
a winning outcome requires contact with War (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015),
the enemy and defeating it in battle. Still, 379 pages, $155.00
Betz acknowledges insurgent dominance of
the narrative, aided by Al Jazeera’s biased reporting, determined the
outcome of the April 2004 battle for Fallujah. But the pivotal role information warfare played there merits stronger recognition. Information
is one of many elements that comprise combined arms warfare, and
too few people seem to grasp this truth. In November 2004, information warfare was a crucial element that was well integrated into kinetic
strategies and operations responsible for winning the second battle for
the city. Still, adroit propaganda by insurgents effectively exploited the
after-effects of the battle across Iraq in 2005, arguably the most chaotic
year of the war.
Betz is skeptical about Army Col. (Ret.) Thomas X. Hammes’ notion
of Fourth Generation Warfare. But I think Hammes is astute, especially
in showing how the Palestinians leveraged strategic communications
rather than weapons to win the political battle—the one that in that
context mattered most—during the First Intifada.
None of these questions detracts from Betz’s central argument. He
has written an outstanding analysis as to how connectivity has affected
warfare, pointing out its potential, as well as its key traps, for warriors,
political leaders, and commanders to avoid. I was pleased to see him
quote Phillip Bobbitt, who warned non-state actors might produce a cataclysm using a nuclear device, dirty bomb, pathogen, or pandemic in an
American city.1 Neither the United States nor any other Western nation
would be the same after that, with one potential consequence being the
eclipse of civil liberties in the name of security. Betz empathizes with
Bobbitt, who believed evolving technology mandates strategies that
focus on the sensitive issues raised in protecting against vulnerabilities,
not just mounting threat deterrence.
A second contribution to this topic—Strategic Narratives, Public
Opinion, and War: Winning Domestic Support for the Afghan War—offers a
1      Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History War (New York, NY:
Alfred A. Knopf, 2002), 819.

96

Parameters 46(2) Summer 2016

collection of penetrating essays on how NATO governments employed
strategic narratives well (or badly) to mobilize support for their participation in the war in Afghanistan. The first part of the book offers
theoretical debates on “narrative” and “strategic narrative.” Case studies
on NATO and other partners follow.
Strategy has proven notoriously difficult to define. Lawrence
Freedman’s Strateg y offers superb insights; but most campaign professionals would find novel his definition of strategy as the “art of creating
power.” They would puzzle over Fabrizio Coticchia and Carolina De
Simone’s concept of framing as “bricks for building” a broader storyline presented in “The Winter of our Consent? Framing Italy’s ‘Peace
Mission’ in Afghanistan.” None of the writers in the volume adequately
places strategic narrative in the context of a story from which narrative emanates, or the themes and messages that flow from narratives.
They tend to conflate story and narrative and omit theme and message.
Distinguishing each of these elements is vital in developing strategies.
Still, it is interesting to see how others think about these notions and
apply them to concrete studies.
The authors also neglect a critical dimension in measuring the
impact of narratives: resonance. Reason persuades, but emotion motivates. Narratives shape behavior when they strike a responsive chord
rooted in emotion. Allied messaging in World War I and World War II
respected that precept, personalizing the enemy and selling the idea the
Germans were monsters we had to vanquish. While true for the second
war, it was not for the first. Even when fighting the Nazis, stirring up
public support to beat Hitler proved challenging.
In his fascinating study of American attitudes and opinions
towards entering the war, historian Steven Casey makes the point many
Americans, even after Pearl Harbor, were reluctant to fight to exact
revenge against Japan.2 Americans showed surprisingly little interest
in fighting the entire German nation. Most Americans had difficulty
believing the Germans were collectively guilty of mass atrocities. Too
many viewed the Nazis as an aberration whom the “good” German
generals would soon topple. Franklin Roosevelt, who towers as both a
political leader and a military strategist, understood the existential threat
Hitler posed. He had a good message in the “Four Freedoms” about the
values America stood for.
But in that era all but devoid of mass communications, how could
Roosevelt motivate Americans to oppose Hitler? He realized they might
not give credence to claims the Nazis were committing mass murder;
however, they might believe reports about smaller-scale barbarities.
Hitler provided Roosevelt the opportunity after British commandos
mortally wounded Hitler’s trusted confederate, Reinhard Heydrich, in
May 1942. The Gestapo thought the assassins came from Lidice and
Lezaky so it executed, or sent to concentration camps, about 400 people
from these towns—a sufficiently small number Americans could get
their minds around. Roosevelt spotlighted this atrocity and mobilized
celebrities like Albert Einstein to denounce the Nazis and expose them
for what they were. The strategy defined the Nazis in emotional and
2      Steven Casey, Cautious Crusade (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001).
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personal terms. It worked. It is a good example of how framing a story,
narrative, theme, and message in a way that evokes an emotional response
is crucial to influencing attitudes and opinions and shaping behavior.
Arguably, the true reason the United States went to war against
Saddam Hussein in 1991 was oil. Andrew Bacevich well summarized
what many political insiders felt was the primary reason for American
military intervention in the Middle East: “to preserve the American way
of life, rooted in a specific understanding of freedom and requiring a
cheap abundance of oil.”3
President George H. W. Bush and his team of closest advisers—James Baker, Brent Scowcroft, and Dick Cheney—understood
mobilizing support for countering Saddam’s seizure of Kuwait and the
threat to Saudi Arabia required sparking emotions. Talking about oil or
geostrategy was not going to gin that up. They believed American voters
liked to put angel’s wings or forked tails on political players. Hence, they
conceived and executed a strategy that demonized Saddam while portraying intervention as a bold stroke to preserve democracy for Kuwait.
Bush mobilized overwhelming support for the war.
The US presidential elections in 2016 offer a good example of
how emotion can evoke an extraordinary response in target audiences.
Consider Donald Trump. Skeptics argue Trump’s narratives lack substance, a problem that may prove fatal in the November general election.
But, Trump defeated 16 candidates, many considered political powerhouses, to win the Republican nomination. He did so, almost entirely,
by tapping into the deeply held emotional hostility to a sense the US
government had left its constituencies behind in favor of wealthy insider
elites whose agendas ignored their hopes and dreams.
None of these questions detracts from the book’s high merit, especially in the specific analyses of the dynamics governing each nation’s
strategic narrative. Each writer is incisive and illuminating, presenting
convincing cases for the conclusions argued. A powerful question raised
is how one can forge a viable war-fighting coalition among actors with
different political systems, agendas, interests, resources, and scope of
flexibility to participate in foreign conflicts. The case studies of country
perspectives highlighted next impressively dissect how each nation
employed strategic narratives to mobilize public support.
Quoting Johns Hopkins scholar Michael Vlahos, the editors note it
is critical to root policies in a foundation of “truths” people can easily
accept because they appear to be “self-evident and undeniable.” Or, put
in campaign terms, the rationale for expeditionary interventions needs
to be credible, defining the stakes and explaining persuasively why and
what action is taken, how it will unfold and for what purpose, and how
it benefits both foreign and domestic actors.
Netherlands, Italy, and Canada failed to produce coherent, persuasive, consistent narratives, costing their governments vital public support,
but not necessarily with the same result. The Dutch government, which
operates through consensual politics, collapsed. Italy’s executive traditionally has wide power in security matters, but poor messaging drained
3      Andrew J. Bacevich, America's War for the Greater Middle East (New York, NY: Random House,
2016).
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public support. Both governments drew down their International
Security Assistance Forces (ISAF). In Canada, elite consensus based on
a pro-NATO strategic culture enabled it to sustain ISAF’s fourth largest
combat presence in Afghanistan. A similar scenario enabled Australia’s
government to hold firm in providing its forces.
Adroit leadership in Germany, notably by defense minister Zu
Guttenberg, produced security-driven arguments and sustainable elite
consensus. These overcame lack of public support. In a system attuned to
consensus politics, the Danes articulated a narrative “attuned to shared
national values and ideals—such as the promotion of human rights—
while still preserving the argument of protecting Danish security…”
Germany’s and Denmark’s ability to present “consistent, compelling,
and clear” narratives that contained elements of purpose, legitimacy,
and success underpinned their engagements.
One striking finding was most governments changed their narratives. Rather than building public support, those actions diminished
it, partly because the new narratives embodied new rhetoric not new
strategies. This political gamesmanship inspired counter-narratives and
undercut scope of action.
Consider France. Traditionally, France accords its executive wide
authority on security matters and debates there have tended—as its many
interventions in Africa illustrate—to occur among elites. Even during
the Algerian civil war, the explosive issue of the use of torture by the
armed forces, which threated to subvert republican values, transpired
among elites, not the general public. Elites still matter, but in this era,
public opinion that translates into votes at the ballot box counts, too.
This lesson proved costly as President Nicolas Sarkozy saddled
himself with an incoherent narrative manifested in a four-page leaflet
expressing elusive objectives for French intervention. Sarkozy regularly
leveraged his frenetic leadership style to muscle his way through such
problems. What the French read in newspapers conflicted with on-theground realities. Confronting election defeat, mounting casualties and
strong counter-narratives forced Sarkozy to pull back. His party lost the
next election. Sarkozy’s rhetorical approach in talking about problems
rather than solving them contributed to the loss.
Hungarian voters are less interested in foreign policy although they
pay attention to casualties. The Hungarian government managed by sticking to its basic narratives of helping Afghans and allies in Afghanistan
without being directly at war, and, crucially, showing support for the
NATO alliance. “This is about NATO, not Afghanistan,” Minister of
Defense Ferenc Juhász declared. Important was his insistence against
taking offensive action or even detaining anti-Afghan government
forces. That dismayed ISAF allies. With uncertain public support for
sending troops, Hungary never altered the rules of engagement or aimed
to win hearts and minds for the provincial reconstruction teams (PRT)
it deployed. It consistently characterized its mission as peacekeeping,
and its refusal to adopt a more belligerent stance enabled it actually to
increase its forces.
Poland stressed the need to be counted as part of an alliance,
knowing the same alliance might one day be called upon to defend it
against Russia. Combined with a narrative about strengthening Polish
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military capabilities, the posture enabled the government to achieve
important goals despite vocal opposition.
Sweden—which is not a member of NATO—provided troops. It
justified its actions through a catch-all narrative that ranged from fighting terrorism to enhancing Afghan democracy. It consciously declined
to specify clear policy goals. This approach reflected domestic imperatives to balance interests among competing target audiences in order to
forge consensus. The Swedes questioned whether Afghanistan posed
a terrorist threat at home, and the military felt uncertain about the
purpose of its mission. The government narrative stressed the need for
Afghan and Swedish security. It argued the use of force, but not war, was
necessary to attain democracy, political stability, governance, and gender
equality. The strategy worked, giving legitimacy to the use of force by
appealing to humanitarian needs, Swedish self-interest, and an argument for strengthening collective security organizations like NATO by
participating in NATO actions.
The British approach reflected a strategic culture that stresses the
US-UK alliance. Like Americans, the British public takes pains to show
support for its military—even when it may disagree with government
policies. All three UK political parties supported intervention, and a
clear narrative emerged that balanced protecting UK security and
joining international partners in the fight against terrorism. A global
outlook and elite consensus bolstered support for participation in the
ISAF. Critically, the campaign reflected a strong belief that protecting
security at home required international engagement.
Britain’s steady hand in the face of mounting casualties after troops
were deployed to Helmand Province in 2006 suggests fatalities do not
necessarily erase popular support in some societies. Curiously, after 2009
the government muddled its narrative by adding humanitarian concerns
to national security goals. Was Britain engaged in peacekeeping or warfighting? Foreign Secretary Jack Straw moved to finesse the issue by
stressing the “astonishing success” British forces were achieving. When
British forces withdrew, it pegged the withdrawal to progress made on
the ground. The Brits declared victory and went home. How that might
affect future actions should the current stalemate in Afghanistan continue or should the Taliban seize power poses interesting questions.
The final chapter addresses the United States. It is an interesting
analysis centered on New York Times stories and how they shaped elite
discourse on Afghanistan. Yet, it is somewhat irrelevant to decisionmaking by Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Priding
himself as pragmatic and down-to-earth, Bush did not read the Times
or many newspapers. He relied on his instincts as the “decider” and, at
least until 2006, surrounded himself with circles of neoconservatives
who pushed their ideological agendas.
An intense intellectual, Obama reads voraciously, but is a self-contained leader who trusts his judgment above all others. Both presidents
produced incoherent narratives for Afghanistan. Neither laid out a
story, narrative, or themes and messages tied to clear policy goals or
that effectively shape an audience’s behavior to achieve a desired endstate. Not surprisingly, most objective observers severely question what
US actions have achieved or what price propping up the Ashraf Ghani
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administration is worth paying. In a recent Atlantic interview, Obama
expressed deep skepticism over whether the United States could solve
the problems in the Middle East. One infers he feels the same about
Afghanistan, whose challenges one can reasonably suggest he understated before taking office. Both of these presidents were strong-willed
individuals for whom media reporting has relatively little effect on
national security decisions.
Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion, and War ends with a commendable
chapter that summarizes conclusions and raises questions for the future.
The current political environment in the United States and Europe has
elicited a healthy debate about the future of NATO. In the 2016 presidential elections, major differences on the issue have emerged between
Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. This book admirably contributes to
that discourse. With clarity it lays out the political dynamics that challenged NATO countries who grappled with joining an American-led
coalition in Afghanistan. Have NATO nations done their fair share in
shouldering the burden of European security? With varying success and
the employment of distinct strategies, NATO political leaders tried to
support the US intervention in Afghanistan. Domestic considerations
affected the extent and terms of each nation’s engagement there. But as a
group, these leaders recognized a strong NATO represents vital hope to
deter or defeat potential Russian aggression. Maintaining alliance with
the United States mattered to all of them.

